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1 Introduction – ‘Illegal Migrants’: The Rosa Parks of our time   
My thesis starts with a story from American history. This story has nothing to do with 
migration, but is about something even more fundamental. It is about how we think of 
‘others’ and what claim those ‘others’ hold to belong to humanity. On December 1, 1955, 
Rosa Parks took one of the first steps towards what would eventually become a sweeping 
campaign to end racial segregation in the United States. At that time, the Jim Crow laws 
segregated black and white people in almost every aspect of life. Instead of separate 
vehicles, each public bus had a section for the blacks who accounted for 75% of the daily 
passengers, located at the back of the bus. The size of the section was determined by a sign 
that could be moved according to the number of white passengers. One day Rosa Parks 
refused to give her seat to white passengers coming into the bus. In her biography Parks 
wrote, “I would have to know once and for all what rights I had as a human being and a 
citizen of Montgomery, Alabama.” In her book she writes that, contrary to common lore, 
she refused not because she was tired after work. Instead she writes: “No, the only tired I 
was, was tired of giving in”.1 
 
I retell this story because to me it brings many parallels to mind. Today’s world is also 
segregated by law and power, and in many ways between black and white2. Despite the 
formal abolition of slavery in 1865, oppression found new life in racial segregation and 
discrimination: terms of which we still continue to struggle with today. At present, the 
majority of the world’s population is ordered to sit ‘in the back of the bus’ by reasons of 
underdevelopment, inequality and an unequal financial order3. That naturally compels poor 
people to move to countries with better possibilities for a brighter future. The ‘moveable 
sign’ in Rosa Parks’ bus still exists, but is now placed by a combination of public 
                                                 
1
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosa_Parks , accessed 1. may 2008  
2
 Life expectancy is almost twice as high in Europe as in Africa 
3
 On causes of irregular migration see the UN Rapporteur on Migrants, 2003 A/58/275, §§ 10 
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xenophobia, narrow economic considerations and rising nationalism. Racial segregation 
has gone global and the ‘Global South’ is now segregated from the rich west. It is from this 
perspective that I see irregular migrants as the Rosa Parks of the new century. Irregular 
migrants struggle against segregation and oppression, and like Rosa Parks, they also claim 
to have a right to pursue life, freedom and happiness. During the days of racial segregation 
the signs read ‘no blacks’ or ‘white only’, today they read ‘no foreigners’, ‘visa required’ 
or ‘residents only’. The words are different, but the message is the same: there are some 
who belong, and some who don’t. The treatment of irregular migrants may today seem fair 
and ‘natural’, since these ‘strangers’ trespass our borders and infringe on our community 
without our explicit consent. We seem to silently overlook that the principle of ‘human 
rights for all’ should also apply to the ‘illegal’ migrant and the ‘bogus’ asylum-seeker.  
 
1.1 Research topic and defining the problem 
This thesis is about how some people are ‘inside’ the protection of the law, while others are 
‘outside’. More specifically it is about how some people are left vulnerable because of 
certain migration policies, criminalisation, economic exploitation and the exclusionary 
logic of borders and nations.  
 
I argue from the point of human rights, but try to balance this approach with a pragmatic 
recognition of the legitimate right of every nation to protect its borders. The goal is to 
expose how current practices render some individuals vulnerable and how human rights 
can reduce this vulnerability without necessarily jeopardizing the security and welfare of 
the state.  
 
From the story of Rosa Parks we learn that some people have more rights than other, and 
that those with fewer rights are kept on the margins of society by law, social practice, 
ideology and history. My point of departure is the concept of vulnerability, as set out by the 
Special Rapporteur on Migrants, Jorge Bustamente4. Bustamente argues that irregular 
                                                 
4
 Bustamente, 2002 
 3 
migrants are structurally and culturally more vulnerable than residents, because of 
asymmetrical power relations created and justified by historical and ideological practices 
and social institutions. Vulnerability is not an inherent personal characteristic of the 
migrant, nor should it be confused with the causes of migration. It is rather a social 
construct that can be dismantled by empowering people with a basic bill of rights that 
bestows all individuals with dignity irrespective of migration status5. Vulnerability of 
irregular migrants is about power relationships and this thesis looks into how these 
relationships are constituted or challenged. An important question framing the issue is how 
the relationship between the sovereign nation-state, its legal residents and the ‘illegal’ 
migrants is or should be constituted and what fundamental principles that should guide 
these relationships of power or disempowerment.   
 
Irregular migration stands as a huge contemporary challenge and our responses so far seem 
inadequate because they do not appear to stop irregular migration, and because they seem 
to bring us at odds with moral and human rights principles. In this thesis I will argue that 
we need to dramatically rethink our responses to borders and irregular migration and that 
the promotion of a human rights sensitive agenda can show us new ways to approach this 
critical issue.  
 
1.1.1 Research question 
How can universal human rights principles contribute to critical re-thinking of borders and 
migration control? 
  
1.1.2 Thesis design 
The IRAC-model is a legal tool for writing legal papers. When aiming for a legal analysis, 
one often separates the design of the research by framing the issue (issue), stating the law 
(rule), applying the law to facts in an analysis (analysis) and then concluding on the likely 
                                                 
5
 Bustamente, 2002 
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outcomes (conclusion). I believe that model is good for case-briefs and legal overviews, 
where case-loads and legal instruments form the backdrop for the analysis. As this thesis is 
multidisciplinary in its approach and topic, I do not apply the IRAC-model rigidly but 
rather as a well-structured dialogue between empirical data (legal instruments and case-
law), theory and my own analysis. The currently adopted method should therefore be one 
that does not necessarily aim at presenting a linear analysis cleansed of contradictions, but 
one that seeks to accommodate existing contradictions through a process of rational 
argumentation. The arguments in this thesis are intended to be universal in scope, but I 
have chosen to use Europe as a case because it is a region that has a sophisticated human 
rights system and at the same time attempts to deal with complex forms of migration. 
Europe is therefore a ‘hard case’, where the dilemmas and complexities are visible. I do not 
apply a strictly case-based reasoning as such, but use the case to highlight my points and to 
give an empirical basis for my conclusions.    
 
The second chapter of the thesis clarifies the concept of irregular and ‘illegal’ migration, 
and outlines how being irregular or ‘illegal’ places some people ‘inside’ and other people 
‘outside’ the protection of national law.    
The third chapter brings human rights onboard as central principles that can qualify the 
relationship between states and individuals, between legal residents and ‘illegal’ residents 
and finally offer some substantial rights that can enable a minimum of dignity for irregular 
migrants.  
The fourth chapter explores the inequalities between irregular migrants and other groups in 
society and how these inequalities are rooted in the exclusionary logic of boundaries and 
community, the myth of territorial control and the consequences of linking migration with 
security and crime.  
The fifth chapter contains the conclusions, where I summarize the key points of previous 
chapters and give a final answer to the research question.  
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1.1.3 Demarcation 
This thesis could apply a number of different methodologies to answer the research 
questions. Though one of the more common approaches to analyse irregular migration has 
been through refugee law and the right to seek asylum including access to fair 
determination procedures, I apply a broader understanding rooted in basic human rights 
law. Women and children are some of the most vulnerable groups in the migration process, 
but I do not explicitly engage with specific legal instruments (CEDAW and CRC) in 
particular or the gender/children perspective in general. I have also refrained from a more 
in-depth analysis of substantial rights and their content, but aim instead to show that 
substantive rights form a relevant baseline for countering some of the vulnerabilities 
created by migration control and borders. Migrants and migrant workers are in many ways 
facing the same challenges, but the term migrant worker is often related to the search for or 
relation to remunerated activity6. I intend to apply a broader notion of the migrant, and do 
therefore not pay any special attention to migrant workers or the relevant instruments 
relating to them, such as the ILO framework.    
 
                                                 
6
 ILO, 2004 
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2 Who is an ‘illegal’ or irregular migrant or what is ‘illegal’ or irregular 
migration?  
This chapter reviews what constitutes irregular migration in terms of national and regional 
frameworks (EU and Council of Europe) and how this relates to forced migration.  During 
this chapter I also focus on the legal and non-legal reasons for why irregular migrants find 
themselves in a vulnerable situation (unequal) compared to other groups in society. Finally 
I highlight some of the conceptual challenges of the term ‘illegal’ or irregular migration. 
The goal is to show how immigration laws create nationals and foreigners and an ‘inside’ 
and an ‘outside.       
 
2.1 National law and practice 
Vulnerability of irregular migrants can be established directly in law (de jure) or as 
emanating from either the implementation or administration of law or other forms of social 
reality (de facto). In practice these distinctions becomes blurred, and I will therefore 
analyse de jure and de facto causes of inequality within the same section.  
 
Most national laws only refer to legal migration, thereby leaving the question of defining 
‘illegal’ migration as a grey area7. This makes the concept of illegal migration an abstract 
idea inferred negatively from laws on legal migration, but detached from any coherent legal 
framework and with wide discretion afforded to individual states and state actors8.  
The very nature of ‘irregularity’ makes data-collection difficult. The estimates are that 
there are somewhere between 3 million and 8 million ‘irregulars’ out of a European 
population of 380 million people, while it is estimated than 500 000 people arrive every 
                                                 
7
 Belgian Alien Law § 2 & 3; The Bristish Asylum Act 2002 §§ 11; Annex 1 Guild in Irregular Migration 
and Human Rights, 2004 
8
 Guild in Irregular Migration and Human Rights2004: 16 
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year9. The statistical uncertainty makes irregular migration an easy prey for different 
political agendas, whether it be those who deny the existence of ‘illegals’ or those who 
believe in an Europe ‘besieged by hordes of illegal immigrants’. 
 
Immigration status is regulated by national domestic law and national authorities define 
illegal entry and stay (and often on an administrative basis)10. Instead of a larger review of 
European immigration law, I use the work of Guerrero who has summed up European 
immigration law and identified seven categories of undocumented migrants in European 
laws11: 
1. People who have entered the country with regular documents, but who stay longer 
than the documents permit 
2. Immigrants who have lost their residence and/or work permit, either because they 
cannot renew it or they have lost it for some other reason 
3. Refugees with short term residence permits who lost their permits, but still stay in 
the country 
4. Migrants who have been released from deportation centres because they could not 
be deported 
5. People who have entered the country in an irregular way - for example through 
smuggling or trafficking 
6. Asylum seekers who have exhausted the asylum procedures and have eluded arrest 
or deportation 
7. Stateless persons who have had great difficulties in obtaining official documents 
 
Few laws in Europe explicitly (de jure) deny those with an irregular stay/entry their basic 
human rights, but irregular migrants have a significant lower level of civil and 
administrative protection/entitlements than legal residents12. E.g. access to health care 
                                                 
9
 Koser, 2005 
10
 Annex 1 Guild in Irregular Migration and Human Rights, 2004 
11
 Guerrero, 2000:6 
12
 Amnesty International, POL 33/007/2006; Doc. 10924, ‘Human rights of irregular migrants’, 2006; 
Irregular Migration and Human Rights, 2004 
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seems in theory to be guaranteed to irregular migrants around Europe, but primarily as a 
precaution and consideration related to the general public health13.  
 
It is a combination of practical (de facto) and administrative (quasi de jure) implications of 
being in an irregular position that result in the denial of effective access to basic rights or 
result in situations where basic rights become practically unobtainable14. Basic human 
rights are indeed basic rights and often fail to fully cater to those with special needs or 
challenges, such as those with mental illness, chronic sickness, children and women. The 
increased cooperation between police, municipalities, health and social services and 
immigration authorities makes it more difficult to access basic rights without being 
reported to the authorities, who in turn will initiate detention and expulsion procedures15. 
Another obstacle to effective access to rights are the sanctions applied to those assisting or 
hiring irregular migrants, with the effect that few irregular migrants can cater for their own 
survival through legal means16.   
 
In conclusion, national laws on entry and stay are ways of determining the ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ of society, and some are more inside (citizens) and some are almost completely 
outside (irregular migrants). The legitimacy of the inequality between irregular migrants 
and others is regulated by national law (sometimes constitutional law) and I will argue also 
by international human rights obligations. The human rights framework stand as crucial 
since the treatment of foreigners is often subject to exceptionality or at least a large margin 
of executive discretion, and often lacks constitutional scrutiny in relation to entry, 
                                                 
13
 Belgium: Unaccompanied minors (Irregular and regular) are entitled to receive health insurance (Loi du 13 
Decembre 2006). Irregular migrants in general have the right to access “urgent medical assistance’ free of 
charge (Loi 1976 M.B. du 31.12.1006); France: “State Medical Assistance’ (Aide Médicale de l’Etat - AME), 
allows irregular to access subsidized health care under certain conditions, See also See Article 38-I(4) of Loi 
Pasqua of 1993; Germany: Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz of 5 August 1997, § 1 para. 1 No. 5 grants 
subsidized health care for different groups, which in principle include irregular migrants. Sweden is one of 
the few European countries that have explicitly denied emergency healthcare to irregular migrants, see 
http://www.thelocal.se/11924/20080522/ accessed 23. may 2008.  
14
 A/HRC/7/12, 2008; E/CN.4/2000/82, 1999  
15
 Amnesty International, POL 33/007/2006; Doc. 10924, ‘Human rights of irregular migrants’, 2006; Guild 
in Irregular Migration and Human Rights, 2004 
16
 Scott, 2004 
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residence and expulsion17. Chapter three consequently explores how human rights can 
ensure a minimum of human dignity for irregular migrants.  
 
2.2 European Union/European Community18 
The whole approach towards irregular migration within the EU is guided by the objective 
of ‘the free movement of persons’ within the Union19. Simply put, the internal integration 
demands that external borders are vigorously protected. The European Union has the most 
well-developed regional migration regime, which has been shaped through working groups 
and bilateral agreements (Trevi Group, Schengen Agreement, Dublin Convention) and later 
as an integrated part of the European Community. The Treaty of Amsterdam (EC Treaty) 
established EC competences in the area of migration in its Title IV as an integrated part of 
the single area of freedom, security and justice20. Article 62 TEC creates the legal base for 
measures relating to border controls and visa policy, and Article 63 (3) TEC creates the 
explicit legal foundation for measures on illegal immigration and illegal residence, 
including return of illegal residents. After the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 entered into 
force, a number of common measures have been adopted to combat illegal immigration 
under Article 63 (3)(b) of the EC Treaty21 and a number of support agencies has been set 
up22. Matters related to borders and irregular migration are therefore firmly rooted in the 
European Union.  
 
The European Union continuously uses the term ‘illegal’ migration, which is used: 
 
                                                 
17
 Guild in Irregular Migration and Human Rights, 2004: 12 
18
 For the purpose of this thesis the European Union and European Community (which is one part of the 
European Union) are used interchangeably.  
19
 Title IV, EC Treaty, 1997 
20
 EC Treaty, 1997 
21
 Council Directive 2001/40/EC, 2001; Council Directive 2001/51/EC, 2001; Council Directive 2002/90/EC, 
2002; Council Directive 2003/110/EC, 2003; Council Directive 2004/81/EC, 2004; Council Decision 
2004/573/EC, 2004; Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004, 2004; Council Directive 2004/82/EC, 2004; 
Council Decision 2005/267/EC, 2005; Draft Directive (COD/2005/0167). 
22
 Ad Hoc Group Migration, High Level Working Group on Migration, Strategic Committee on Migration, 
CIREA, CIRAFI. See also the directives and decisions above. 
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“[…] to describe a variety of phenomena. This includes 
third-country nationals who enter the territory of a 
Member State illegally by land, sea and air, including 
airport transit zones. […] In addition, there are a 
considerable number of persons who enter legally with 
a valid visa or under a visa-free regime, but “overstay’ 
or change the purpose of stay without the approval of 
the authorities; lastly there are unsuccessful asylum 
seekers who do not leave after a final negative 
decision.23” 
 
There is not given a more substantial definition of an ‘illegal third country national’ than 
“entering a Member State ‘illegaly”, which means crossing a border in contravention of 
national laws on legal entry and stay. It is still the state that defines who belongs ‘inside’, 
though it has to some extent delegated power to supra-national entities and other states to 
help control the border between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. In Europe, the nation-state 
remains its brother’s keeper.     
 
2.3 Council of Europe 
The Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution 1509 (2006) on 
the Rights of Irregular Migrants, where it was recognized that  
 
“Irregular migration may take place in two 
circumstances. The first is when a foreigner enters a 
country in breach of regulations concerning entry, and 
the second is when a foreigner, having entered a 
country legally, overstays contrary to immigration 
regulations.24” 
  
This is generally the position taken by most countries and organisations, but it is important 
to note that in a European context where the EU uses the term ‘illegal migration’, the 
Human Rights Rapporteur of Council of Europe recognizes that: “’Irregular migrant’ is the 
term preferred [since it] is more neutral and does not carry the stigmatisation of the term 
                                                 
23
 COM/2006/0402 final */ 
24
 Doc. 10924, ‘Human rights of irregular migrants’, 2006 
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‘illegal’. […] It is wide enough to cover all those in an irregular situation, whether tolerated 
or not tolerated by the authorities, whether they entered the country legally or illegally, 
whether they work or do not work, whether they are independent or dependent (children, 
aged), whether they are failed asylum seekers or persons who have failed to apply for 
asylum, etc.” 25 
 
2.4 Forced migration 
Refugees can in some ways be seen as ‘outside’ society in the sense, that they have 
completely been ejected from their state of origin. They are however ‘inside’ in the sense 
that they have a special protection regime established in the 1951 Refugee Convention. In 
reality there is no clear boundary between forced migration as understood in terms of the 
1951 Refugee Convention and ‘normal’ migration often referred to as ‘economic 
migration’26. Rather this thesis recognises that: 
 
“The complex and varied causes which lie behind 
migration suggest that it is perhaps best viewed as a 
continuum ranging from forced to voluntary movement. 
Between these two extremes, there are varying degrees 
of free choice or coercion involved in migrants’ 
decisions to move to another country27.” 
  
People fleeing poverty and general deprivation are more often than not classified as 
‘economic migrants’28. In 2003 the UNHCR29 stated that: 
 
“[…] migrants and other persons who seek protection, 
such as asylum seekers and refugees, are all part of the 
same migratory flows and all require protection. […] 
safeguards should be established that allow different 
migratory categories to be identified and granted 
protection. Since there are limited legal options for the 
                                                 
25
 Doc. 10924, ‘Human rights of irregular migrants’, 2006. 
26
 For a discussion of forced migration, see Guy Goodwin-Gill, 1996 
27
 Amnesty International, POL 33/007/2006 
28
 Goodwin-Gill, 1996  
29
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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entry into and residence in determined territories, 
asylum systems are increasingly being used to give 
certain migratory categories the possibility of remaining 
in a country.30” 
 
Irregular migration has often been discussed because of the way it affects the asylum-
system, and most efforts have revolved around disentangling legitimate asylum-seekers 
from ‘normal’ migrants as if the latter is one coherent group31. This has contributed to an 
artificial dichotomy between ‘real’ refugees forced to flee and ‘economic’ migrants moving 
out of ‘free will’. The dichotomy between forced and voluntary migration is also evident in 
other aspects of migration related laws. The applied refugee system and the Palermo 
Protocols (on Trafficking and Smuggling) constitute a dichotomy between ‘voluntary’ or 
‘forced’ actions, granting greater protection to those ‘forced’ to migrate (refugees and 
victims of trafficking) than those who move ‘voluntarily’ (economic migrants and those 
arriving by smuggling). This approach seems to be insensitive to the finer details of 
migration and leaves great room for national interpretation as to where exactly the line is 
drawn between voluntary and coerced movement – between those who are ‘inside’ refugee 
law and those who are ‘outside’ refugee law32.  
 
Instead of positioning my argumentation in relation to forced or voluntary migration, I 
follow the argument of Taran when he points out that: “[…] violations of migrants’ human 
rights are so widespread and commonplace that they are a defining feature of international 
migration today”33. The implications of this argument is to recognize that all migrants merit 
some form of protection, and that refugees often are in need of stronger international 
protection.     
 
                                                 
30
 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 2003 
31
 The UNHCR’s three-pronged approach (regional/country of origin, domestic and EU prongs) try to 
separate out ‘economic migrants’, but at the same time put in place safeguards against non-refoulement.  
32
 Tuitt, 1996; Jeremy Harding, 2000  
33
 Taran, 2000; A/HRC/7/12, 2008 
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2.5 Irregular migration34 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration to “occur 
outside the rules and procedures guiding the orderly international movement of people”, 
which is an approach taken up by other international organisations when defining irregular 
migration35. This definition seems pragmatic and contributes to set ‘irregular migration’ as 
something abnormal, unruly and outside the law and general management. The definition is 
rather abstract because it defines irregular migration in relation to other definitions of 
migration (namely that defined by ‘the orderly movement of people’) instead of a more 
substantive approach based on actions or characteristic of the individual36. This static 
approach maintains the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ segregation between people, because it 
presumes that the ‘inside’ group of people moving in an orderly fashion is the group doing 
things the ‘right way’ and the rest is doing it the ‘wrong way’.    
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Migrants argues that that any definition of ‘irregular’ 
migrants must be based on more than the reasons for migrating or means of immigration, 
since migration occurs across a wide spectrum of interests and degrees of coercion. The 
approach should be based on the vulnerable position of the individual such as to 
encapsulate more than the narrow definitions of resident aliens, refugees, asylum-seekers, 
nationals and citizens. In essence, the full system of human rights protection should give 
basic protection to all individuals before, under and after a border crossing, irrespective of 
the migrants’ motive and means37. 
 
The approach seeks to ensure that no one is left without rights, and that individuals with an 
uncertain legal standing in national law should as a minimum be protected by human rights. 
By this approach a clarification or regularisation of the irregular status would conceptually 
reduce the vulnerability arising from an irregular status. This will to some extent solve the 
                                                 
34
 For discussions on definitions and challenges see E/CN.4/2000/82, 2000 §§ 15-43;  
35
 It is worth noting, that the primary objective of the IOM is not protection activity, but rather the orderly 
movement of people. IOM Constitution, Article 1 
36
 See ILO definitions or the definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention  
37
 For more precise definitions see E/CN.4/2000/82, 2000 §§ 36 
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problem of protection, but does not solve the problem of migration control. I do however 
appreciate the point that the construction or framing of the problem of irregular migration 
is part of the problem, and therefore also a barrier for achieving a solution.    
 
2.6 The power of the word ‘illegal’ 
The power to define or phrase an issue and the following re-affirmation of this definition is 
essential to understand why it is worth elaborating on the definition of irregular or ‘illegal’ 
migration. Bourdieu, in his ‘Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture’ (1970), 
introduce the concept ‘symbolic power’ as the power to make a given understanding of 
reality to appear true and objective and at the same time exclude alternative 
understandings. The symbolic power of definition is exercised, albeit unknowingly, by 
educational institutions, experts, judges and media, and all contribute to reaffirm the 
symbolic power. Though not a concept that I explicitly use in the following analysis, I 
apply this understanding of power in much of my analysis of law, power and the symbolic 
power exercised through the ‘objective’ and ‘true’ interpretation of contemporary 
migration and international law.  
 
There is a group of people labelled ‘Illegals’, ‘Irregulars’, ‘Undocumented’, ‘Unwanted’, 
‘Sans Papies’ and ‘Clandistinos’. These words conjure up images of something out of 
place, subversive and dangerous. The fact is that there is no international working legal 
definition behind these words. My postulate is that the abstract concept of ‘illegal’ 
migration blurs the social realities of migration, increase vulnerability and hamper 
pragmatic and effective policy-solutions. My postulate is also that the common 
denominator is not the subversive character of the people covered by these words, but 
rather the effect that heterogeneous groups collectively labelled ‘illegals’ are kept in the 
legal, social and political no-man’s land of Europe. The application of the concept ‘illegal’ 
migration or ‘clandistinos’ is entangled with symbolism and social meaning, with the result 
that:       
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“The term ‘illegal’ has escaped its legal, and even 
grammatical, moorings and now stands alone as a noun. 
It does not conjure British backpackers overstaying on 
Australia’s Gold Coast, or Kiwi’s working in London’s 
pubs. It conjures sweatshops and sex shops, poverty and 
race. The face of the imaginary illegal is poor and 
brown and destitute. This imagery works against careful 
attempts to define illegal migrants as those who 
transgress migration laws, it complicates 
attempts to respond appropriately to the phenomenon 
and to understand how and why it challenges 
sovereignty.”38 
 
This is not just a question of semantics and discourse, but has legal consequences since 
derogations and limitations in human rights law are justified if they can be said to be 
prescribed by law and necessary to protect national security, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others39. The way we talk about the problem is relevant 
because public perception among communities and officials on irregular migrants is 
important for creating a human rights sensitive public culture. Policy-makers put 
themselves in a difficult position by using the concept ‘illegal migration’ and ‘migration 
control’, thereby implying that migration can be controlled, which by no means is an easy 
task. In other words, using ‘illegal migration’ as a word contributes to the very problem 
that politicians are trying to solve. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Laws on entry and stay are national laws on who belongs and who does not, which is 
reflected in irregular migrants de facto and de jure unequal access to rights. Irregularities 
can occur during the migrant’s entry, stay or by a specific activity and is described as an act 
in contravention of national immigration laws. Since there is no common agreement on a 
substantial definition of irregular migration, there exists a number of inconsistencies 
between heterogeneous national definitions and a collective international or regional 
                                                 
38
 Dauvergne, 2004 
39
 See articles 4(1) of the ICCPR and Article 17 (ECHR); General Comment No. 31, 2004, §§ 6; as well as 
the jurisprudence of non-discrimination articles analysed in chapters to follow.  
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response40. In terms of unequal access to human rights, irregular migrants face several 
immediate challenges41: 
• Stronger and more complex push/pull effects in migration dynamics, but fewer 
legal ways of entering Europe 
• De facto and de jure lower standing than legal residents, where the lack of a right to 
stay is most notable  
• Lesser effective access to basic human rights due to fear of detention and expulsion  
• Rising public demands for increased use of expulsions  
• A definitional or discursive imbalance of power, where irregular migrants per 
definition is out of place and without legitimate demands to society 
 
There are strong dichotomies in immigration law and refugee law, which separates those 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’, the ‘real’ refugee from the ‘bogus’ refugee (the economic migrant). I 
will in the following chapters argue how human rights can soften these dichotomies and be 
a more delicate and precise tool for analysis and action.  
 
An irregular status does necessarily arise as a consequence of a material or substantial 
(in)action such as not paying taxes, failure to pay for social services or crime. As such 
combating irregularity seems to be a question of control over territory and population, and 
therefore also a question of who is ‘inside’ and who is ‘outside’ the protection of the law. 
The laws in force in the days of Rosa Parks segregated people by colour, today migration 
law segregates people because of nationality or immigration status.  
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3 International law 
This chapter explores how international law guides the relationship between the nation-
state and the individuals within its jurisdiction, and what treatment that may be legitimate 
in relation to irregular migrants. Drawing on the conclusions in the previous chapter, this 
chapter uses a human rights sensitive approach to argue that irregular migrants have a 
minimum claim to human dignity and that they can never be ‘outside’ human rights law. 
More specifically, this chapter first reflects on some theoretical observations about how 
developments in human rights law contribute to a framework of universal protection (the 
universal personhood). The chapter then reviews the legal basis for such a framework by 
balancing state sovereignty and human rights obligations, and to what extent immigration 
status may permit limitations on human rights. Finally I review some substantive articles 
(most notably non-discrimination) that can enable the universal personhood and give basic 
protection for irregular migrants.    
 
There is no coherent and fully established international legal framework governing 
migration, but rather a patchwork of different principles drawing on such different branches 
of international law as refugee law, consular law, human rights law, air law and labour 
law42. These international regimes are supplemented by regional treaties such as those 
established by the European Union or Council of Europe, and bilateral agreements such as 
those governing readmission or guest worker agreements.  
 
3.1 Development of a universal personhood?  
Does there exist a basic bill of rights that applies to all individuals irrespective of citizenship 
status or relationship to particular nation?  If this can be said to exist, this basic bill of rights 
may help to balance out the unequal relationship between irregular migrants and residents.  
                                                 
42
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Based on a traditional Westphalian43 perception of states as closed systems, Brubaker 
argues that citizenship is ‘both the instrument and the object of social closure’44. This 
means that citizenship is both the enabler of claiming rights and the way of excluding those 
not belonging to the community. Soysal argues for another position, where international 
law and dignity-discourses nourish a concept of ‘universal personhood’ based on the 
development of a post-national citizenship with increased rights for non-citizens45. Joppke 
finds middle ground between these two positions when he emphasizes that despite the 
existence of universal rights, the state is still the central entity for claiming rights and also 
the venue for negotiating these rights46. I accept that there is an expansion of rights for 
foreigners, but remains sceptical since this expansion of rights and right-holders seem to 
cater for a rather limited group of people. There is a well established European citizenship 
and a growing recognition of the rights of guest workers and migrants47, but as legal 
categories are set up to cater for a number of different groups, the noose is tightening 
around the neck of the ‘unwanted’ immigrants, the illegal and the destitute who are not 
part of the selected few.  
 
In sum, my point of departure is that there has been an expansion of rights, and these rights 
are not necessarily linked to a nation-state through citizenship or even regular migrant 
status. The nation-state is still the duty-holder and therefore also the implementing entity. 
An expansion of rights and right-holders has in turn spurred new forms of exclusion to 
delegitimize this development where it is convenient, whether it be ‘unlawful combatants’, 
‘manifestly ill-founded asylum applications’ or ‘illegal’ aliens. The conflict remains 
between the proclamation of universal respect for human rights on the one hand, and national 
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self-determination on the other, and therefore Hannah Arendt’s critique of the hollowness of 
human rights in a world of nation-states is still valid48.    
 
3.2 Balancing the sovereign rights of states and human rights obligations 
The very essence of ‘state-existence’ lies with the control over territory and population, as 
judicially expressed in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on The Rights and Duties 
of States (1933), whereby a state is defined by having a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The 
sovereign right of a state to grant entry and stay is expressed in a judgement from the USA. 
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States from 1892, the Supreme Court held that in connection 
with immigration control and detention:  
 
“It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to its self-preservation, to 
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, 
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”49 
 
It is further established by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that:  
 
“[…] as a matter of well-established international law 
and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right 
to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory”50. 
 
An analysis of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights also shows that: 
 
“In all of its decisions, the ECtHR reaffirms that it does 
not forbid states from regulating immigration and 
details a number of legitimate reasons for states to 
restrict immigration, including the economic well-being 
of a country and threats to public order. These 
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restrictions are applicable if ‘necessary in a democratic 
society”.51 
 
The question at hand is therefore not whether a state has a right to admit or expel 
foreigners as such, but under what circumstances this can be done and what status and 
rights this person has once she is present on the territory. This is an important point for the 
purpose of this thesis. 
 
The concept of domestic jurisdiction as enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter can 
clarify the relationship between sovereignty and human rights obligations. This article was 
originally intended to insulate domestic affairs from international scrutiny, but have over 
the years been reformulated as international relations have developed52. In 1923, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice held that: 
 
“The question whether a certain matter is or is not 
solely within the [domestic] jurisdiction of a State is an 
essentially relative question; it depends upon the 
development of international relations. […] The words 
‘solely within the domestic jurisdiction’ seem rather to 
contemplate certain matters which […] are not, in 
principle, regulated by international law.”53 
 
The enabling line here is that in order to be “solely with the domestic jurisdiction’ 
the matter must not in principle be regulated by international law. Another 
authoritative, though not legally binding document, is the Declaration on the 
Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They 
Live (1985)54. The balance is struck between sovereignty and human rights 
obligations in the following way:  
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“Nothing in this Declaration shall be interpreted as 
legitimizing the illegal entry into and presence in a 
State of any alien, nor shall any provision be interpreted 
as restricting the right of any State to promulgate laws 
and regulations concerning the entry of aliens and the 
terms and conditions of their stay or to establish 
differences between nationals and aliens. However, 
such laws and regulations shall not be incompatible 
with the international legal obligations of that State, 
including those in the field of human rights.” (My 
emphasis)  
 
International human rights and migration have been firmly established as a concern for the 
international community, and therefore qualifies the extent of sovereignty as understood 
within the UN Charter55.  
 
Once persons are situated on the territory or within the jurisdiction of a signature state, the 
general obligations in human rights instruments are normally triggered. The obligations are 
generally such that: 
 
“States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, 
[of the ICCPR] to respect and to ensure the Covenant 
rights to all persons who may be within their territory 
and to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.56” (My 
highlights) 
  
In her report on the human rights of migrants, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights explains:  
 
“In exercising their sovereign right to regulate the 
entry, stay and movement of migrants and their policy 
on immigration, asylum and refuge, States should bear 
in mind the international obligations they have assumed 
in the area of human rights. In other words, States party 
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to the [ICCPR], [ICERD], [CEDAW] and [CRC] must 
guarantee to anyone who is in their territory and subject 
to their jurisdiction the rights recognised in those legal 
instruments.”57 
 
In the first chapter I highlighted that being an ‘irregular’ migrant is a question of national 
law on who is ‘inside’ and who is ‘outside’, and I have now further established that 
national law regulating migration matters must be in conformity with international 
obligations. I argue that there is an increased human rights sensitive base-line in dealing 
with aliens, but this base-line is established in a hierarchy of rights depending on 
immigration status58. I reject the dichotomy between sovereignty and human rights, since 
“international legal obligations may, and frequently does, restrict a States' freedom of 
action and thereby the exercise of its sovereignty, but they do not diminish or deprive it of 
its sovereignty as a legal status.”59 Most international obligations arise from the voluntary 
commitment made hereto by states. It is worth noting that the laws guiding entry and stay 
are in essence national law, which is subordinate to international law under the principles 
established in each instrument, in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1966) or 
according to the general principle of ‘Pacta Sunt Servanda’. Sanctions and measures rooted 
in national law must therefore not be in contravention with international obligations, such 
as those under human rights law60.  
 
3.3 Immigration status and rights  
Some rights may legitimately be restricted or derogated from as long as they adhere to 
some specific legal principles61. The Human Rights Committee, the authoritative body of 
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the ICCPR (one of the three instruments compromising the Bill of Rights), states on 
limitations:  
 
“[that when] limitations are made, States must 
demonstrate their necessity and only take such 
measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of 
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and 
effective protection of Covenant rights. In no case may 
the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that 
would impair the essence of a Covenant right.”62 
 
The European doctrine on limitations is a balance of legitimate interests done with strict 
interpretation and it must be necessary in a democratic society and with proportionality 
between aim and means. The state has a certain margin of appreciation in determining how 
to best implement the provisions of the ECHR63. When it is decided whether a limitation is 
necessary in a democratic society it is often considered whether the limitation is responding 
to a ‘pressing social need’64. 
 
The increased criminalisation of irregular migrants and securitisation of matters 
related to irregular migration may contribute to legitimize certain limitations and 
restrictions. It is therefore worth noting that irregular migrants must at least not be 
treated as criminals and that: ‘Immigrants […] even those who are in a country 
illegally and whose claims are not considered valid by the authorities, should not be 
treated as criminals’65. I briefly note Article 31 of the UN Refugee Convention, which 
prohibits punishing people for illegal entry as long as they do so in order to apply for 
asylum in good faith. Current practice of criminalising illegal entry when an asylum 
application is rejected, seem to ignore the initial good faith in arrival and seeking 
asylum.  
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So as established by authoritative sources, the ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’ status does not deprive 
the migrant of her basic rights nor does it relieve the state of its obligations. The enjoyment 
of basic human rights does not necessarily presuppose a right to stay or a prohibition on 
expulsion. They are rather rights that apply as long as the individual is within the 
jurisdiction of the state.  
 
In conclusion I claim that irregular migrants are firmly placed inside international law and 
ipso facto inside national law, which restricts the potential harmful consequences of being 
placed on the ‘outside’ of the national legal order and community. Rosa Parks was first and 
foremost a human before she was coloured, just as irregular migrants are humans before 
being irregular migrants. The development of international law has made citizenship less 
relevant, and to that extent we can talk of a ‘universal personhood’ enabled by a state’s 
international obligations, which ensure irregular migrants a standing in the national legal 
order.  
 
3.4 International human rights law and vulnerability   
There are a number of substantive articles that can enable the universal personhood and 
give basic protection and dignity to irregular migrants. Firstly, I set out a general ‘bill of 
rights’ applicable to irregular migrants. Secondly, I explore the principles of non-
discrimination and equality and how these principles can reduce the vulnerability arising 
out of de jure and de facto inequality between irregular migrants and other groups in 
society. Thirdly, I highlight a number of European substantive human rights articles and 
their relevance for irregular migrants. These three lines of arguments will give substance to 
the idea of an ‘universal personhood’ that can be implemented to ensure human dignity and 
reduce vulnerability.      
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I believe that the following basic ‘bill of rights’ can be applied almost universally, since it 
draws upon regional and international legal instruments and apply to citizens and non-
citizens66: 
• The right to life: unreasonable force should not be used to prevent the entry of non 
nationals, and authorities have a duty to try to save those whose lives may be in 
danger in seeking to enter a country.67 
• Protection from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
return process should respect the right to dignity, and coercive measures should be 
‘kept to a minimum’.68 
• The right to equality: there should be no discrimination in the enjoyment of rights; 
or discrimination on grounds of race or ethnicity in admission, stay or expulsion.69 
• Protection from slavery and forced labour.70 
• Detention should be used only as a last resort, judicially authorised, and not for an 
excessive period of time71. 
• The right to seek asylum and the non-refoulement principle should be respected.72 
• The right to an effective remedy before removal, which should be before a 
competent, independent and impartial authority, with interpretation and legal aid.73 
• Respect for private and family life; removal should not take place where there are 
‘particularly strong ties’.74 
• The right to marry; ‘total barriers’ should not prevent right-holders from doing so.75 
• Adequate housing and shelter guaranteeing human dignity.76 
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• Emergency health care should be available to irregular migrants.77 
• Social protection where it is necessary to alleviate poverty and preserve human 
dignity. Migrant children should enjoy social protection on the same footing as 
national children.78 
• Rights in employment: fair wages, reasonable working conditions, access to court to 
defend rights, trade activity. The state should ‘rigorously’ pursue employers 
breaching these terms.79 
• Right to primary and secondary education for all children80. 
 
3.4.1 Non-discrimination and recognition before the law 
Two lines of reasoning are pursued in this section. First I argue that non-discrimination 
principles can reduce the vulnerable position of irregular migrants by eliminating arbitrary 
and discriminatory treatment between legal residents and irregular migrants. Secondly, a 
more general comment can be made as to show that non-discrimination is a fundamental 
pillar in the creation of a strong universal personhood and how non-discrimination can 
challenge the legitimacy of an inequality based on borders, immigration rules and 
citizenship.  
 
The first challenge of reducing the vulnerable position of irregular migrants is how to place 
them ‘inside’ the law, when most rules of immigration either de jure or de facto place them 
‘outside’ the rules that can grant them protection. Article 6 of the UDHR and Article 16 of 
the ICCPR both establish the principle that “Everyone shall have the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law’’. This is the first step towards a ‘legal existence’ 
and the very basis of the universal personhood.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
76
 UDHR Article 25; ICESCR Article 2, 11(1) (As part of adequate standard of living); See ESC Committee 
General Comment 4; It can be argued that Article 8 and Article 3 of the ECHR together can be invoked in 
caes of ’intolerable’ living conditions, see: Guzzardi v. Italy (7367/76); Cholewinski, 2006 
77
 ICESCR Article 2, 12(1); ESC Committee 14; Article 28 ICMW; European Social Charter (Revised) (See 
analysis below); Article 3 ECHR (see Pretty v. United Kingdom) 
78
 UDHR Article 23(3); ICESCR Article 2, 9, 10, 11; European Social Charter (Revised) Article 12, 13; 
ICMW Article 27   
79
 Cholewinski, 2006 
80
 UDHR Article 26; ICESCR Article 13; CRC Article 2 and 28(1); CMW Article 30; Article 2 of the First 
Protocol ECHR read together with Article 14 ECHR; Foreign Students v United Kingdom (7671/76, 15), 
1977 ECHR 
 27 
The principle of non-discrimination features in several major human rights documents, and 
it has been established by an international tribunal that non-discrimination may in some 
cases be jus cogens81. The Inter-American Court has understood that: 
 
“[t]he notion of equality springs directly from the 
oneness of the human family and is linked to the 
essential dignity of the individual.82” 
 
“[The Court considers] that the principle of equality 
before the law, equal protection before the law and non-
discrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole 
legal structure of national and international public order 
rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that 
permeates all laws.83” (My emphasis) 
 
Discrimination can occur when: a) laws formally treat one group differently from other 
similarly situated groups (unless the different treatment is seeking to remedy existing 
inequalities, b) laws or policies that appear to be facially neutral but use categories that are 
proxies for illegitimate discrimination, c) when any law, policy, or action has the practical 
effect of disadvantaging a group regardless of whether the policy is facially neutral, and d) 
when states fail to take effective affirmative measures to achieve equality among disparate 
groups84. The differential treatment is discrimination when: 
 
“…it has no objective and reasonable justification, i.e. 
if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be realised.”85  
 
Jurisprudence also holds that “…that discrimination means treating differently, without an 
objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations”86. Border 
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control and differentiation between citizens and aliens may therefore be legal and 
acceptable as long as it complies with these principles.  
 
The ICCPR contains two non-discrimination provisions. Article 26 is a ‘free standing’ 
guarantee of non-discrimination in that it prohibits discrimination with regard to all rights 
and benefits established by the law. Article 2 in the Covenant, is on the other hand, a 
‘dependent’ provision as it guarantees non-discrimination with respect only to the rights 
guaranteed by the ICCPR. According to the HRC:  
 
“[…] the general rule is that each one of the rights of 
the Covenant must be guaranteed without 
discrimination between citizens and aliens.”87 
 
Article 26 provides for a more general non-discrimination principle by stating that: 
 
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of 
the law. […] the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
[…] race, colour, national or social origin, or other 
status.” 
 
This entails an obligation not to make discriminatory laws, and that no law shall be 
enforced or implemented in a discriminatory fashion88. Since Article 26 is a general non-
discrimination provision it also applies to immigration laws and the application thereof, as 
well as putting obligations on the state to ensure that no third party violate the rights of 
irregulars89. This means that illegitimate discriminatory treatment at the workplace, in the 
housing sector, educational system or in access to justice all fall within this provision.  
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The CERD is the most progressive of the global instruments on race, and its essential 
principle of non-discrimination on account of race has a strong claim to the status of 
peremptory norm of international law90. Due to the intersection of racism, discrimination 
and migration, this Convention is of particular relevance for irregular migrants91. The scope 
of the Convention is wider than many other conventions, and quite progressive of its 
time92. It is further noted that the Convention does not define the guarantees of civil, 
political, social and economic rights protected in Article 5, which therefore enables the 
Committee to apply new developments in jurisprudence in favour of reducing vulnerability 
of irregular migrants. Article 1(2) allows states to draw distinctions between citizens and 
non-citizens, but still holds that these distinctions must not be discriminatory (Article 1(3)) 
and should be judged in the light and purpose of the Convention.  
 
The Convention on Migrant Workers (CMW) is the most migrant-specific human rights 
instruments, setting out a broad range of human rights for irregular migrants. Few of these 
rights are ‘new’ rights, but rather a compilation of several other instruments such as the 
ICESCR. The rights enshrined in Part III of the CMW apply to all migrant workers, 
irregular as well as regular, and covers in particular rights relating to economic activity, 
social rights and extensive provisions relating to fair trials/procedures and expulsion. Most 
importantly, the extensive non-discrimination provisions provide that migrant workers 
must not be deprived of any of these rights by reason of any irregularity in their stay or 
employment. Article 18 provides that migrant workers ‘shall have the right to equality with 
nationals of the state concerned before the courts and tribunals.’ Article 24 affirms that 
‘[e]very migrant worker and every member of his or her family shall have the right to 
recognition everywhere as a person before the law.’ The Convention is however weakened 
by extremely low ratification, especially among migrant-receiving countries. The 
Convention and the related declaration should however not be underestimated since it 
provides a valuable framework for cooperation to prevent irregular migration, and also 
becomes an important instrument of protection as more and more states ratify it and 
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migrant sending countries simultaneously become transit or receiving countries93. Most 
importantly, this Convention has a higher level of specificity and therefore leaves less room 
for acceptable differential treatment of irregular migrants.    
 
I conclude that several documents provide protection against discrimination of irregular 
migrants, and that states are allowed to differentiate between ‘irregulars’ and legal residents 
under certain circumstances. There is a fine balance between whether an act constitutes 
differential treatment or discrimination, and the former can only be justified based on the 
reasonability and proportionality of the measure and legitimacy of the aim. The evaluation 
of reasonability and legitimacy becomes increasingly difficult as the issue of irregular 
migration is linked to crime, questions of social cohesion, scarce welfare resources and 
security.  
 
A more in-depth discussion of the application of non-discrimination and equality principles 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but non-discrimination law is in theory and practice not 
without challenges. Critical issues are what form of equality that should be sought after 
(equality of treatment or equality of result), what comparators that should be used in non-
discrimination cases, what positive obligations arise from non-discrimination articles and 
what standards that should be used in evaluating legitimate aims and what standards and 
burdens of proof should be applied94. The greatest challenge in implementing non-
discrimination principles in relation to irregular migrants are the fact that it is commonly 
accepted that differential treatment between irregular and legal residents is proportional to 
legitimate aims of border protection, security and welfare.  
 
What if the act of violating immigration rules as such did not justify differential treatment? 
What would that mean for how we approach belonging within the nation state, entitlements 
to rights and the individual contribution to society? In the times of Rosa Parks racial 
segregation was, by the white majority, seen as a completely natural thing that ensured a 
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stable, secure and homogenous society. Challenging the status quo thinking of society (and 
law) is never an easy thing.           
 
3.4.2 Expulsion 
Expulsion is a key event in understanding the dynamics of irregular migration. Situations 
of irregularity are created or exacerbated when people are granted an ‘exceptional leave to 
remain’ because of non-refoulement concerns or when expulsion is temporarily impossible 
due to technicalities. Neither of these two scenarios would normally lead to a certain legal 
position or an indefinite right to stay. Fear of expulsion is also what drives many irregular 
migrants underground and it is the single largest cause of the vulnerable position of 
irregular migrants95.  
 
It is important to note, that the promotion of human rights of irregular migrants does not 
prohibit expulsions, as long as the measures taken are in conformity with international 
standards and obligations. Human rights law provides substantial and procedural rights in 
relation to expulsion, as well as a general prohibition against mass expulsion. Any act of 
expulsion should have procedural safeguards including the ability to challenge the decision 
to deport, access to interpretation services and legal counsel, access to a review in case of a 
negative decision, as well as proper consideration of the practical and legal realities 
surrounding the case96.  
 
The two most relevant concepts are the prohibition against refoulement and the rights 
related to privacy and family rights97.  For the purpose of this thesis I deal mostly with the 
concept of non-refoulement, which can be summed up as a prohibition against expulsion to 
a country where there is a real risk of being subjected to torture or ill-treatment98.  
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The Convention Against Torture (CAT) provides strong safeguards against refoulement, 
but only defines torture to mean ‘any act […] inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.’ 
This means that persecution and harm inflicted by non-state actors would fall outside the 
scope of the CAT99.  
 
The non-refoulement right under the ICCPR is derived mostly from article 7100. In its 
General Comment (1992), the HRC stated, inter alia: “In the view of the Committee, States 
parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, 
expulsion or refoulement’. An important distinction is present in Article 13 of the ICCPR 
which limits procedural safeguards to lawfully present aliens only. This safeguard is 
extended to undocumented migrants in Article 22 of the CMW. The principle of non-
refoulement is the most often used principle in relation to expulsion and extradition, and 
exists in a number of instruments and is said to be part of international customary law101.  
 
The rules relating to expulsion constitute a more or less explicit recognition of a universal 
personhood with specific substantial and procedural rights.   
 
3.5 The European Framework 
The European Union (EU/EC) and the Council of Europe are the two main regional 
institutions in Europe dealing with migration. The EU has applied a strong non-
discrimination regime for a privileged group of regular migrants, but this has been coupled 
with an emphasis on the prevention of clandestine migration which has “undercut, or even 
eclipsed, the concern to protect the rights of irregular migrants”102. The Council of Europe 
has to a larger extent applied a rights-based approach to irregular migration, and several 
                                                 
99
 CAT Articles 1(1) and 3(1)  
100
 See also Article 9, 14, 16 and 26 
101
 Goodwin-Gill, 1996  
102
 Grant, 2005 
 33 
cases at the European Court have dealt with the rights of irregulars, mostly in relation to 
non-refoulement (Article 3) and family life (Article 8). The following sections deal with 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the basic human rights provisions 
in the EU/EC.   
 
3.5.1 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
The Convention is an extremely valuable instrument in ensuring dignity and freedom for all 
in Europe, since it is the binding regional instrument on human rights. The general 
framework enabling entitlements for irregular migrants is based on Article 1, that states: 
“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms […] of this Convention.” The European Convention is often coined as a 
document of civil and political rights, but it is important to note that the Court has 
recognised that “[…] while the convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political 
rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic nature”103. Furthermore, the 
Court established a strong interpretational principle in Soering v UK by stating:  
 
“(…) the object and purpose of the Convention as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human 
beings require that its provisions be interpreted and 
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and 
effective (…).” 
 
In the Tyrer-case the court further held that “the Convention is a living instrument which 
(…) must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”104 There is therefore plenty 
of case-load to support a progressive promotion of the rights of irregular migration.   
 
Due to the accessory character of the non-discrimination provision in the ECHR there has 
been only few cases invoking Article 14, and a heavier reliance on the substantive articles 
in question. Article 14 gives a non-free standing right to non-discrimination (accessory), 
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but it does not presume a violation of a substantive right and is therefore to some extent 
autonomous. A key requirement is that the facts of the case fall within the orbit of a right 
guaranteed in the Convention105. It is hoped that Protocol No.12 of the Convention will 
reaffirm the principle of non-discrimination, because it gives a free-standing right to non-
discrimination in “The enjoyment of any right set forth by law […]”. The present legal 
framework with its limited non-discrimination provisions and especially the doctrines 
established by the Court’s jurisprudence make it difficult to apply a strong non-
discrimination framework in favour of irregular migrants106.   
 
Litigation in the Court is an important way of framing and bringing onboard the rights of 
irregulars, since there are few specific references to the rights of irregular migrants in the 
wording of the ECHR107. Like the ICCPR, the ECHR also contains provisions that ensure 
the legal standing of irregular migrants and a venue for claiming rights108. Article 13 
requires that everyone “whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority”. This has often been 
invoked to secure adequate safeguards in conjunction with Article 3 of the ECHR, since it 
may be argued that the absence of effective judicial scrutiny of executive/administrative 
decisions may not constitute an ‘effective remedy’ for the purposes of Article 13109. More 
importantly it can form the basis for a stricter separation between enforcement of 
immigration laws and access to rights, since irregular migrants are often denied an effective 
remedy either because of lack of legal standing or because of fear from being deported or 
detected prevents them from going to court. Increased focus on ensuring remedies could 
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assist in cementing the legal standing of irregular migrants and reduce their vulnerable 
position.    
 
Some states use denial of social and economic rights as a mean of forcing irregular 
migrants to leave the country. Exclusion from social provisions is sometimes the direct 
result of a rejected asylum application110. Though not established as a firm principle, the 
court may draw social and welfare obligations from the positive obligations in Article 3, 
when denial of such services will meet the threshold of inhuman or degrading treatment 
contrary to the provisions of the Article. This could be the case where the migrant is highly 
vulnerable due to age, illness or external conditions severely affecting their ability to take 
care of themselves111. This could also apply in cases of emergency medical treatment, 
where the denial of such treatment to irregular migrants may violate the right to life under 
Article 2. Violations of social and economic rights often fall outside the scope of the ECHR 
even though poverty, labour rights and access to social services are some of the issues 
linked most closely to the vulnerability of irregular migrants112.     
 
There is a rather well-elaborated case-load dealing with judicial guarantees, detention and 
rights under detention113. The general principles are that the detention decision must not be 
arbitrary in the light of the facts of the case114 and must comply with the principle of legal 
certainty115.  
 
The ECHR does ensure some basic de jure protection of irregular migrants, but is 
challenged by: 
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• Lack of practical access to the Court, since most national laws does not grant a 
leave to stay while the case is pending in national courts or the case falls due to 
non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, which in practice often result in the 
prevalence of immigration law over human rights law116 
• The fact that the Convention does not deal with socio-economic rights  
• A rigid and conservative reading of the non-discrimination provision 
• The lack of a specific and binding framework for dealing with migrants rights, and 
in particular irregular migrants 
 
3.5.2 One promising case from the (revised) European Social Charter 
The European Social Charter guarantees social and economic human rights in areas of 
housing, health care and education117. The 1961 version was revised in 1996, and the 
Committee overseeing the Charter can under a 1995 Protocol receive collective complaints. 
Even though most of the charter, according to the attached appendix, only applies to 
nationals or other persons residing or working lawfully within the territory of the state 
parties, the Committee has ruled on a case concerning the rights of irregular migrants. In 
FIDH v. France, the Committee concluded that: “the Committee holds that legislation or a 
practice which denies entitlement to medical assistance to foreign nationals, within the 
territory of a State Party, even if they are there illegally, is contrary to the Charter118.” The 
even more relevant point related to my argumentation is that the Committee referred to the 
VCLT and stated the restrictions in the Charter (as mentioned above) should be read 
narrowly so as not to deprive the Charter life and meaning. I argue that the reasoning in 
this case strengthen the argument for a clear ‘base-line’ for fundamental rights, which 
should be respected irrespective of immigration status. Furthermore this case highlight 
that it is the non-discriminatory and effective enjoyment of rights that should be the guiding 
standards in evaluating the performance of states.  
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3.5.3 European Union 
All 27 member states of the EU have to different degrees transferred power to the EU, and 
are therefore subjects to its primary laws (the treaties), its legislation and the case law of 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (“ECJ’) – all together making out the 
Acquis Communautaire. EU law takes precedence over domestic law within its field of 
competence. This ‘supremacy’ of EU law entails that national courts must give primacy to 
EU law over inconsistent domestic measures. The EU legal system can thus be described as 
‘supranational’ in character. 
 
According to Article 6 (F) of the ‘Treaty on European Union’, the “Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” It refers explicitly to 
the ECHR in, stating that “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
[ECHR] and […] as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law”. In the European Union the ‘Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ might hold some promise for the rights of 
irregular migrants, since it does not distinguish between civil and political rights and social 
and economic rights, but collect all the rights in one charter119. Unless specified otherwise 
it applies to all irrespective of nationality, but some rights are limited to nationals or legal 
aliens (e.g. social security).  
 
There is no specific legislative instrument concerning the rights of irregular migrants (or 
illegal third country nationals as it is called within the EU), since most attention to this 
topic has been devoted to control, expulsion and prevention of entry. The Racial Equality 
Directive does reaffirm a strong non-discrimination principle, but its effect for irregular 
migrants is uncertain120. Article 3(2) provides that the Directive “is without prejudice to 
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provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals 
and stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and to any treatment which arises 
from the legal status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons concerned.”121 The 
Preamble provides a prohibition against discrimination based on race or ethnic origin, since 
it on principle ‘should also apply to nationals of third countries, but does not cover 
differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions 
governing the entry and residence of third-country nationals and their access to 
employment and to occupation.’122 Cholewinski notes that the Directive’s  
 
“[…] direct impact on the treatment of third-country 
nationals in the field of immigration control is likely to 
be nominal, largely as a result of the measure’s limited 
material scope. [..and that] Member States recognize 
that they are making explicit distinctions on the basis of 
nationality and arguably also that they are acutely 
aware that immigration control activities are 
particularly susceptible to discrimination on the 
grounds of race, ethnic or national origin or religion.”123  
 
EU legislation still seems most preoccupied with ensuring the rights of those legally inside 
the community.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Irregular migrants are in a vulnerable position because of the unequal power relations 
between them and legal residents, and the fact that they often live on the margins of society 
and law. I have argued that there exist a set of rights that can ‘level’ the playing field and 
decrease vulnerability of irregular migrants.  
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Firstly, human rights obligations qualify the relationship between the sovereignty of the 
nation-state and the individual124. This means that migration control must be in conformity 
with international obligations (in this case human rights) and that an irregular status cannot 
justify infringements on basic rights.  
 
Secondly, non-discrimination provisions ensure a balanced and fair power relationship 
between those legally present and the irregular migrant and at the same time allow for 
differential treatment under the principles of ‘legitimate aim’, ‘proportionality’ and whether 
it is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and responds to ‘pressing social needs’125.   
 
Thirdly, a number of specific substantial rights protects and empowers irregular migrants 
vis-à-vis state authorities and the settled community126. There is not any absolute guarantee 
or protection against expulsion or a right to stay, but human rights law does ensure 
procedural safeguards to protect irregular migrants from arbitrary treatment and legitimize 
their claims on human dignity.  
 
Most of the rights and principles reviewed in this chapter can be invoked by all individuals 
irrespective of their affiliation with a state or their immigration status. State responsibilities 
are triggered as soon the individual falls within the effective jurisdiction of the state. I 
argue that this doctrine can be seen as a form of ‘universal personhood’127, where 
legitimate claims on rights can be made independently of migration status or citizenship. 
Irregular migrants can be placed ‘outside’ by national immigration law, but they will 
always be ‘inside’ international human rights law and therefore also back ‘inside’ national 
law.  
 
Generally speaking, human rights vulnerabilities cannot be detached from their ideological 
and historical context. For the purpose of this thesis the context is rooted in historical and 
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ideological conceptions of borders and communities coupled with xenophobia and a 
construction of ‘the other’ that takes on various functional tasks related to maintaining the 
community and power relations between the settled natives and the arriving strangers. It is 
this context that the following chapter reflects upon.  
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4 The anatomy of illegality, or the creation of vulnerability 
‘There are friends and enemies. And then there are Strangers.’128 
 
The first two substantial chapters have dealt with how the relationship between the 
newcomers and the settled are established in law, and how applied human rights law can 
help us see beyond the ‘inside-outside’ perspective of current migration approaches, and 
instead recognise the value and dignity of the individual irrespective of her status as an 
irregular migrant. Rosa Parks not only confronted the Jim Crow laws on racial segregation, 
but also the implicit and submerged public perceptions on humanity, communities, race, 
poverty and social relations. To fully appreciate the scope of our contemporary problems 
and research area, this thesis now takes a more sociological approach and explores how the 
vulnerability of irregular migrants is multiplied or even created by some of the submerged 
logics of migration control, community formation and the anxieties related to the ‘other’.  
 
4.1 How borders create vulnerability 
The main argument here is that the configuration of borders may reduce or increase the 
vulnerability of people129. The systems of human rights protection must be responsive to 
the globalisation of segregation, inequality and oppression. The global push and pull effects 
of migration take much more fluid, mobile and transnational forms than the mechanisms 
for implementing human rights, which are often closely connected with the nation-state. 
Social relations and informal cross-border trade are examples of ‘borderless’ interaction 
where a border-focussed approach fails to fully tackle or appreciate problems and 
possibilities.  
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Geographical space is transformed into territory when it becomes demarcated and divided 
as a political strategy to affect and control people, phenomena and relationships130. 
Territory therefore exists as a construction of space, which can be transformed and altered 
depending on the configurations of power. The complex linkages between space, power 
and communities are obscured by the political and legal devotion to the territorial nation-
state that makes it difficult to apply or consider alternative strategies detached from 
traditional notions of space and territory131. What we see is an ongoing struggle between 
those who continue to insist on a state-nation-citizen constellation and those who recognize 
that this construction is slowly changing132.    
 
Immigration law is more than the application of rules and laws, but an active part of 
‘nation-building’, where decisions on admittance become constituting actions in 
constructing the national identity133. The general turn towards restrictive policies in Europe 
is closely related to the contemporary discussions of national and European identity and the 
discretionary character of much immigration legislation easily bend to these trends of 
closing the nation. The argument for ‘open borders’ or ‘a right to immigrate’ may be 
unfeasible134, but following the argument of Kostakopoulou we shall critically reconsider 
our basic assumptions of borders, community and their link to nationalistic narratives135. 
These critical reflections shall not only be intellectual exercises but shall also creatively 
assess current forms of community formations detached from borders and nations and 
increase the focus on how social relations are in fact constituted across borders and space.  
 
European integration has shown that the reconfiguration of borders and space is possible136. 
This reconfiguration is done to promote economic prosperity and social development. The 
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dark side of these skills of reconfiguration are seen when diplomatic agreements, aid 
conditionality and security arrangements are mended together to provide for the projection 
or externalisation of ‘borders’ into third countries, who are normally in a significant 
subordinate negotiation position vis-à-vis a united EU137. Council Regulation, 2004 
provides for the stationing of immigration officers overseas to ensure that the combat 
against illegal migration is fought in the country of first departure. Borders and border 
officials are no longer met at the physical border post, but it is projected into trade 
agreements with third countries, administrative procedures and at the airports in Africa. It 
is noteworthy that the attempts to address root-causes for migration seem to lack the same 
financial and political commitment as that which is given to control and deterrence 
measures138. 
 
Fundamentally, I argue that the legal or ideological conceptions of borders, state and 
community are somewhat dislocated from the development of demography and migration. 
In 2000, the UN forecasted that by 2050 the (then) 15 member states of the European 
Union would need more than 40 million migrants to maintain the overall size of their 
populations139. When Spain regularised 570,000 migrant workers in 2005, it was on the 
recommendation of employers, a clear sign that the economic development of labour 
markets and production had circumvented de jure immigration restrictions140. The ‘black 
economy’ in particular and the economic globalisation in general increasingly show a lack 
of respect for the political borders of the nation state, which is evident in the discordance 
between the demand of flexible labour, the desire of people to move and the legal channels 
to do so141. Restrictive laws on immigration have not lead to a reduction in the number of 
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migrants, but rather an increase of irregular (or illegal) channels of migration, and a growth 
in trafficking and smuggling142.  
 
The present situation leaves irregular migrants caught in the dislocations between their 
physical presence, the socio-economic reality surrounding them and their weak legal 
standing ‘outside’ the national legal order. Irregular migrants should be brought ‘inside’ 
the protection of the law. Specific steps forward could be ratifications of the Convention on 
Migrant Workers and regional projects that go beyond control and deterrence, and aim at 
strengthening cross-border networks to deal with the vulnerable position of irregular 
migrants.  
 
4.2 How communities create vulnerability 
This thesis assumes that we construct and define our social and legal categories not only 
from the positive of ‘what it is’, but also from ‘what it is not’. In the words of Derrida, 
“Identity becomes this process of continual separation and relation to ‘The Other’”143. It 
becomes evident, that the process of separation and relation is not only one of rhetoric or 
nationalism, but becomes an ‘objective truth’ when it is inscribed in law and daily practice. 
Immigration laws and legal entitlements are therefore part of the complex of symbolic 
violence (Bourdieu), which reconfirms the nexus between nation, population and the state. 
The rise of xenophobia and racism in Europe towards migrants “is therefore not about 
objective characteristics, but about relationships of domination and subordination, about 
hatred of the ‘other’ in defence of ‘self’, perpetrated and apparently legitimated through 
images of the ‘other’ as inferior, abhorrent, even subhuman”144. Those individuals who are 
without a territorial and political fix-point (for example through citizenship) become state-
less, or as explained by Arendt: a refugee and an outsider145. The concept of ‘the other’ is a 
submerged logic in international cooperation and law. By establishing the EU as an `Area of 
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Freedom, Security and Justice’, the outside of Europe became an area of un-freedom, 
insecurity and injustice146. The reference to ‘area’ is deeply linked to the concept of a 
common border, thereby establishing an ‘inside’ that is much needed in creating the 
European identity and European integration.  
 
Integration and citizenship is a social process of empowering an individual to become a 
politically and social participatory citizen interacting on equal terms with the rest of 
society147. The process of exclusion is inversely a process of separation and 
disempowerment. Thus while cast in the language of inclusion, belonging and universalism, 
the process of creating a modern citizenship has systematically established strangers and 
outsiders148. This process of exclusion can be countered by strengthening and applying the 
‘universal personhood’ described in the previous chapter, which will also ensure that 
irregular migrants have a ‘voice’, rights and claims in their host communities, so as to 
avoid stereotypes, exclusion and a vulnerable position149.  
 
4.3 ‘Illegality’ and the circumvention of international obligations  
The universality of human rights poses new challenges in delineating rights and 
obligations, which traditionally have been delineated according to citizenship or diplomatic 
relations. Dauvergne notes on the concept of ‘illegality, that:  
  
“[…] a rhetorical focus on ‘illegals’ shifts the 
boundaries of exclusion. When a part of the population 
is acknowledged to be ‘illegal’, it is excluded and 
erased from within. Even when sovereignty at the 
border is breached, labelling people within one’s 
territory ‘illegal’ imprints sovereignty. It adjectively 
shifts the argument about membership and entitlement. 
[…] their contribution to the economy or their long 
term residence [are] counted as evidence of their 
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transgression. […] the label ‘illegal’ allows us to shift 
the US-THEM line from the border of the nation to 
within the nation, wherever it is required.”150 
 
Inspired by Dauvergne, I argue that ‘illegality’ is a way of projecting issues of borders and 
control into all aspects of rights and life. Practical circumstances have made it difficult to 
physically control flows over borders, so different internal mechanisms of control and 
separation have been set up151. Dauvergne puts it well, when she notes that the mark of 
being ‘illegal’ places the person “[…] not only as an outsider to a particular nation, but as 
an outsider to any nation. As such, the other is outside the law itself, and, in a word, 
illegal”152.   
 
The Draft Directive on Common Standards for Return153 is an example of how an irregular 
status will affect one’s de jure rights. Current debates on the Directive focus on whether 
irregular entry should justify the application of lesser standards compared to those who are 
illegally staying due to a rejected asylum-request or expiration of visas154. The construction 
of ‘irregularity’ and ‘illegality’ again stands as an attempt to circumvent the legal 
obligations arising from an already existing physical presence within state territory.  
 
I argue that there exists a plurality of legal frameworks applicable to irregular migrants. 
Laws governing entry, labour rights, criminal law and human rights law are just a few 
examples of several legal paradigms intersecting each other. The construction of illegality 
denies and supports the fact that ‘irregulars’ are woven into the economic fabric of the 
nation, albeit as labour that is cheap and disposable. They remain “[…] a caste outside the 
boundaries of formal membership and social legitimacy”155. When law is seen as a scene of 
contention, different interests and power relations seek to promote the dominance of some 
paradigms over others. The construction and application of illegality means that irregular 
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migrants find themselves subject to what is in effect penal or criminal sanctions, but 
without the adequate safeguards because the sanctions are deemed to be only 
‘administrative’156. Any legal advocacy has to take into account multiple sources of law 
that can protect the individual, and excavate the multiple identities that can enable these 
sources of law. The concept of ‘intersectionality’ used in discrimination-litigation is a 
helpful source of inspiration in combining these different legal sources to the maximum of 
human rights protection157. By using an ‘intersectional’ approach one can better grasp the 
fullness of the human rights protection by recognising that an irregular migrant may be 
protected from abuse in her capacity as a girl-child, asylum-seeker, worker and coloured. 
This approach enables several legal instruments, as well as provide framework for a much 
richer analysis of vulnerability.  
 
4.4 Control and Security  
National debates on irregular migration are often concerned with control and the credibility 
of government capacity to protect nation and borders158. UK Home Secretary John Reid 
vowed that “enforcement action against those who overstay their welcome would be 
essential to ‘restore public confidence.’”159 And in France, the Prime Minister Sarkozy has 
also expressed a desire to show that “France is in control of migration, and not a passive 
recipient”, which has been followed up with new legislation and an increase in deportation 
orders160.  
 
The human rights of irregular migrants have fallen prey to a general ‘securitisation’ of 
migration161 and the Special Rapporteur has pointed to the fact, that the legal regime of 
‘illegality’ is supported and enabled by a general public climate of hostility and 
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xenophobia162. The increased conceptual and discursive link between irregular migration 
and criminality is still pervasive in EU documents, though it is realized that: 
 
“Public perception which tends to establish a link 
between some societal problems and illegal 
immigration should also be taken into account [and the 
Member States] must promote a rational debate […] to 
eradicate racism and xenophobia including by adopting 
and implementing effective EU legislation in this 
area.”163 
 
In July 2006, the Commission adopted a ‘Communication on Policy priorities in the fight 
against illegal immigration of third-country nationals’164. This programme has been 
severely criticised for over-emphasising control and ‘criminalisation’, linking migration 
with terror, criminality and security. Human rights figures as a gloss in the introduction, but 
plans for implementation are largely absent. All the operative clauses focus on control, 
criminalisation and deterrence and fail to apply a practical human rights sensitive 
approach165. The same can be said in the detailed work on sanctions for those who employ 
irregular workers, where there is no rights-based approach seeking to create effective 
remedies, voice and decrease vulnerability for the migrant workers166. It can be argued that 
sanctions on those hiring irregular migrants will only drive irregular migrants further into 
the black economy, unless these measures are coupled with ways to effectively defend and 
access rights for irregular migrants.  
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The 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (Article 3(2)) calls for states 
“to introduce penalties for the unauthorised crossing of external borders”. Member states 
have now introduced penalties for unauthorised entry ranging from a few days 
imprisonment to two years167. ‘Infringements of national immigration rules’ allow states to 
report a person to the Schengen Information System (SIS), the European database of 
undesirables, on the grounds that his or her presence constitutes a threat to public policy or 
national security168. So through one irregular border crossing and subsequent reporting to 
the SIS, all participating EU Member States are obliged to refuse future entry to the person 
concerned169. Since there is no common definition on what constitutes an ‘infringement of 
national immigration rules’, the reporting is based on national policy despite its 
geographical wider implications. This potentially violates the non-refoulement principle, 
the effective right to seek asylum and the non-discrimination principle since persons in 
similar situations may be treated differently in terms of SIS reporting170. The totality of 
closure is also seen in the ‘Directive on the mutual recognition of decision on expulsion of 
third country nationals’, where EU Member States must recognise and enforce expulsion 
decisions made by another Member State, when there is “serious and present threat to 
public order or to national security and safety” or/and “failure to comply with national rules 
on the entry or residence of aliens”171. This means that the total ejection from the EU can 
be based on a conception of ‘illegal entry or residence’ on which there is no European 
consensus172. 
 
Bigo reflects on how migration and globalisation have changed surveillance, punishment 
and control in relation to the criminalisation of migrants. Control has relocated from the 
physical border-crossing and to more fluid forms of control in the interior or at a 
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distance173. Visa-control, carrier-sanctions, internal checks and external cooperation are all 
initiatives to address this, but all of them more or less fail to make adequate safeguards on 
human dignity and individual rights. In A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) and in the 
Two Treatises of Government (1690), John Locke conceptualised the idea that the right to life, 
liberty and property are natural laws, which simultaneously restrict the power of a state and 
also oblige it to protect these rights. It is this reasoning that resonates in international human 
rights law, and the relationship between state and citizens. But I would perhaps argue that this 
argument turned upside down becomes harmful for irregular migrants, when the state defines 
its outsiders, the ‘illegals’, as those whom society needs to be protected against.  
 
It can be said that the objective complexities of migration in economic, human, political 
and legal terms escape a rational public debate and fall prey to increased xenophobia and 
public anxiety that put demands on politicians ‘to do something’ to increase the sense of 
control. Politicians are therefore forced to do something ‘visible’ to enhance the sense of 
security and at the same time attempt to pursue more pragmatic and effective policy 
options dealing with rational cause and effect.  
 
The bastard linkages between irregular migration and security have serious practical 
consequences on basic human rights, since the relationship changes from being between a 
right-holder (the irregular migrant) and the duty-bearer (the state) to a relationship between 
the enemy (the irregular migrant) and the state as the defender of the nation. When 
irregular migration is transformed to a security threat and the ‘illegal’ migrant personifies 
that threat, even the most draconian measures might seem legitimate.       
   
4.5 The case of expulsion – The myth of control 
I do not argue against expulsions as part of immigration management as such, and I accept 
that it remains a central and a necessary feature in the maintenance of the liberal 
democratic state. But what I argue against is the development where expulsion-procedures 
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have “[…] now become ‘normalised’, ‘essential' instruments in the ongoing attempt to 
control or manage immigration in European states.”174 
 
The actual number of deportations has remained more or less unchanged except for a few 
countries175. Deportation is made difficult by a series of rights-based constraints regarding 
deportation and the unstable nature of public opinion176. Interestingly, Gibney and Hansen 
argue that the restrictive or exclusionary application of non-arrival measures “[…] is the 
perverse fruit of increasingly inclusive practices towards foreigners who are resident in 
these states.” Non-arrival measures become central, because arrival automatically triggers 
international human rights responsibilities. By referring to the Platonic concept of the noble 
lie, Gibney and Hansen suggest that deportation is simultaneously ineffective in terms of de 
facto control and essential in terms of the symbolic value of control. It is the most visible 
form, the extreme manifestation, of control over territory and people.   
 
“By maintaining policies on deportation, the state 
furthers the myth – and it is nothing more than a myth – 
that it can actually remove from its territory all criminal 
non-citizens and/or illegal migrants. No state is willing 
to collapse the distinction between legal and illegal 
migrants.”177  
 
More generally, the continued emphasis on the myth of control is a crucial element in 
maintaining the ‘imagined community’ as one of borders in terms of belonging and 
entitlements.  
 
The ‘irregular’ migrant serves as a ‘Homo Sacer’, a term borrowed from the Italian 
philosopher Agamben178. A Homo Sacer is a person that exists ‘inside’ the community, but 
yet ‘outside’. She is therefore expendable or can be killed with impunity. To me, it seems 
that the precarious legal standing of the irregular migrant makes her within some law, but 
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at the same time outside some law. This not only applies to law, but to society in general. 
She could very well interact on a daily basis with the community and the economy. The 
fact, that she can be somewhat part of the community, but still outside make her a perfect 
sacrifice in times of crisis. Crack-downs on irregular migrants could just as well be phrased 
as ‘purifying’, whereby scape-goating is taken to the extreme with the total deportation of 
the migrant along with all the symbols that have been attached to her. The symbolic link of 
‘irregular’ migrants with crime, disease and social disintegration enables a purification 
process, where a crackdown on this group will causally result in less crime and increased 
social cohesion for society as a whole. Sacrifice in times of danger and change has always 
been part of human culture, and it seems reasonable to argue that during times where the 
nation fears for its existence it needs to perform rituals of sacrifice – In our case, the 
deportation. The tendency to use deportation orders as a tool for crime control and ‘the 
stick’ in integration policies jeopardizes the legitimacy of the migration system in 
particular and the state in general, since many deportation orders cannot be carried out and 
certainly do not address the more structural problems of crime and lacking social cohesion 
in society. The implementation of the principles outlined in section 3.3.2. and 3.4.1 all 
ensure fair, transparent and individual procedures and safeguards that protect individuals 
against scapegoating and public demonising. 
 
4.6 Inequalities and migration 
There is a submerged argument in the public debates on migration, which holds that less 
restrictive border control will lead to an exodus from the poor South to the rich North. This 
argument makes border control a matter of survival and self-defence, where those who are 
deemed to contribute to the community are separated from those who are perceived a strain 
on resources. Moving from this argument to a macro-perspective, borders can be seen as an 
allocation and geographical fixing of populations to specific territories, where the global 
poor become prisoners of the local, and cannot enjoy the same benefits of the compression 
of time and space as the global elites179. From this perspective, irregular migration can be 
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seen as a form of civil disobedience against an unjust allocation of space and belonging. 
Describing a global Apartheid upheld by law and raw power, Cheng writes that those not 
favoured by global capitalism and valued as expert labour are expected “to remain forever 
in their global über-ghettoes, the garbage-heap of a superfluous humanity”180.  
 
The reasons for migrating cannot be de-contextualised from poverty, environmental 
changes and economic development, and the global chain of cause-effect in terms of 
vulnerability should not be underestimated. European states actively recruit skilled workers 
from the health sector and well-educated people from developing countries, which create a 
short term negative impact caused by the brain-drain in the developing countries. Over 
fishing by European supertrawlers in the waters of West-Africa leaves small fishing 
communities impoverished, and forces sons and husbands to leave for Europe in search of 
work. The dumping of subsidized American and European products in small farm 
communities in Africa, forces the workforce to migrate to cities in Europe to find 
employment and a future. Local communities benefit from remittances from migrant 
workers, and the employment opportunities resulting from demographic deficits in some 
European countries act as powerful pull-effects181. My argument is that global and local 
developments create a number of vulnerabilities and possibilities and that migration is both 
a cause and effect to this. It is widely recognised that migration management should 
balance deterrence and prevention, but this acknowledgement stands in sharp contrast to 
the realities of global inequality and the continued resilience to bring about solid change in 
migrant sending countries through free trade and development aid182.  
 
As argued in the previous section, the symbolic reaffirmation of borders as something that 
can be controlled or even closed is a costly fiction in many ways, and the continued 
insistence on this fiction may divert our attention from doing something about the root 
causes of migration. By looking at migration as a social burden and as something that can 
be controlled we may obscure solutions that can transform migration into social and 
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economic value and at the same time deal with causes of migration. Just as refugees refuse 
or are unable to avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin based on fear 
of persecution, millions of people leave their countries because there country fail to address 
economic, social or environmental issues. It seems like the majority of nation-states have 
failed to live up to their part of the social-contract and the system of nation-states find it 
increasingly difficult to justify border control. 
 
4.6.1 Global responsibility: solidarity or law? 
I wish to make a number of abstractions on the emerging doctrine of non-territorial rights 
or ‘solidarity-rights’. Not because I believe that this is an accepted source of hard law or 
established legal paradigm, but because I believe it to be informative for engaging the 
global responsibilities of nation states. In particular, I would like to mention Article 28 of 
the UDHR, which refers to an international order that enables the rights in the declaration. 
Human rights violations are both cause and effect of irregular migration and a progressive 
reading of this article could give rise to non-territorial obligations to ensure a fair world 
order and an implicit condemnation of those measures keeping out those people who 
migrate to enjoy basic human rights. The ICESCR also supports such an argument, by not 
making any reference to either jurisdiction or territory in Article 2 concerning state 
obligations183. It could be reasoned that if there exists an extra-territorial obligation to 
combat poverty, then the migration prompted by the failure to do this cannot be manifestly 
wrong or illegal. Any sustainable form of migration management must empower human 
agency and dignity in all parts of the migratory process and move beyond territorial 
responsibility. No man is an island, and neither are states.   
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4.7 Conclusion  
The racial segregation during the time of Rosa Parks was rooted in a number of historical, 
social and ideological events and enforced through different legal, political and social 
practices. The same can be said in relation to the vulnerability of irregular migrants. Where 
previous chapters have established that national laws on immigration are pronouncements 
on who is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, this chapter has explored the social and symbolic 
underpinnings of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.  
 
Firstly, I have argued that borders and boundaries are manifestations of power, which are 
shaped to maintain the unequal relationship between the settled and the newcomers. These 
manifestations are made ‘logical’ and acceptable through law and social practice, but 
should be challenged if we wish to find new and effective means to deal with migration184. 
The failure of contemporary approaches to borders and human rights are revealed by the 
fact that the global push and pull effects of migration does not respect political borders, and 
that human rights violations take on much more fluid and transnational forms than the 
mechanisms of human rights protection, which are often rooted in the nation-state185. The 
present situation leaves irregular migrants caught in the dislocations between socio-
economic reality and their weak legal standing ‘outside’ the national legal order.  Irregular 
migrants should be brought ‘inside’ the protection of the law through the application of the 
‘universal personhood’ outlined in chapter 3.  
 
Secondly, irregular migrants are placed on the ‘outside’ of any law through the 
‘securitisation’ and ‘illegalisation’ of irregular migration.  The universality of human rights  
pose new challenges in delineating rights and obligations, which traditionally have been 
delineated according to citizenship or diplomatic relations. Instead of a positive and 
constructive response to this challenge, western societies have responded by a 
criminalisation and securitisation of irregular migration186. The questionable linkages 
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between irregular migration and security have serious practical consequences on human 
rights, since even the most draconian measures might seem legitimate to protect the 
security of the nation187. The construction of ‘irregularity’ and ‘illegality’ here stands as an 
attempt to circumvent the legal obligations arising from an already existing physical 
presence within state territory188. 
 
Thirdly, the continued emphasis on the myth that borders can be controlled or closed is a 
crucial element in understanding how the community can define itself by borders and with 
an identifiable ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. This myth of control is persistently repeated in acts of 
deportation, which seem to have more of a symbolic effect than an actual effect in terms of 
border management189. Deportation becomes more than an act of migration control, but a 
ritual sacrifice aimed at regaining an abstract control over territory and population.   
 
Finally, it seems that migration cannot be de-contextualised from poverty, environmental 
changes and economic development. If we do not engage with root-causes of migration, we 
will not succeed in managing migration. We cannot insist on the inviolability of borders, 
while the effects of our trade, aid and foreign policies compels people to move and we 
cannot expect people “to remain forever in their global über-ghettoes”. If we insist on this, 
we actively contribute to the ‘racial segregation’ of the century, where the irregular migrant 
through her actions becomes the Rosa Parks of this century.  
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5 Final conclusion 
I started this thesis by asking, how we can apply human rights principles to promote a 
critical thinking about borders and migration management. Current thinking is 
characterised by: 
• Sharp distinctions between wanted and unwanted migrants 
• Strong belief in the inviolability of nation-state borders 
• Increased criminalisation and securitisation of matters related to migration  
• Regional cooperation that focus more on protecting and safeguarding narrow 
understandings of the ‘inside’ than protecting rights of those effectively within 
national jurisdiction 
• Narrow interpretation of who is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ and who should constitute 
right-holders within the territory  
 
I concluded that an irregular status comes from a violation of national immigration law, 
which can roughly be described as a pronunciation of who belongs and who do not, and 
following from that, what kind of entitlements one can claim according to national law. 
The ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ thinking permeates the field of migration, and some similar 
dichotomies can be found in traditional thinking of refugee law or definitions of irregular 
migration190. Immigration law is therefore about establishing an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of 
the nation.  
 
In the chapter on international law I have established that even though every state has the 
right to control its territory and population, every act must conform to the international 
obligations of the state. It is in these international obligations that we find basic notions of a 
‘universal personhood’, which grants rights and dignity to individuals irrespective of 
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whether they belong or not according to national law. The only enabling factor is their 
presence within the jurisdiction of the state, which is enough to constitute them as rights-
holders and ‘inside’ the protection of human rights law. Any differential treatment between 
irregular migrants and those legally in the country must correspond to a number of 
principles related to the proportionality of the means and the legitimacy of the aims. Since 
these principles are subject to dynamic interpretations it becomes relevant to analyse how 
we see borders, migration control and irregular migration. This analysis has been done in 
chapter 4, where I have applied some critical perspectives on how borders not only affect 
the implementation of human rights, but also our very ideas of who is ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ 
human rights law.  
 
Since the causes and effects of irregular migration do not respect political or administrative 
borders, any human rights sensitive response must accommodate this fact. In chapter 4, I 
concluded that there are several dislocations between actual presence inside socio-
economic realities and irregular migrants’ weak legal standing outside national law. I have 
argued that an effective implementation of the ‘universal personhood’ as outlined in 
chapter 3 will be one way of remedying the vulnerabilities arising from these dislocations. 
The ‘universal personhood’ as a universal bill of rights are however challenged or even 
threatened by current approaches to irregular migration, which emphasize control and 
criminalisation. I see these developments as attempts to circumvent already existing human 
rights obligations. Human rights as universal principles will therefore be eroded if we do 
not change the way we think of migration, borders and rights.  
 
Several perspectives that can inspire a way forward have been excavated in this thesis:         
• If we apply the same approach to borders and migration that we have always done, 
we will get the same results191 
• The problem is not just irregular migration as such, but how we think or 
conceptualize migration 
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• Borders as spaces or geography that can be managed or controlled are to a large 
extent legal or political fictions which are exposed daily by unrestricted global 
movement of capital, people, culture and ideas 
• Borders and communities are dynamic constructions that can be altered towards a 
human rights sensitive framework 
• Human rights for irregular migrants must be based on protection needs, but does not 
necessarily mean a prohibition on deportation or a right to immigrate 
• Responses to irregular migration should be guided by the actual contribution or 
effect and not on default perceptions on irregular migration  
• The effective access to human rights should not be impeded by the effective 
implementation of immigration law  
• Empowerment of irregular migrants does not mean an ineffective immigration 
regime, but rather that irregular migrants can speak up against oppression. This 
would strengthen the struggle against black economies, human trafficking and 
exploitation at work  
 
Rosa Parks claimed her humanity and exposed racism embedded within the institutions, 
laws and social practices of the American society. She did not want special treatment, just 
equal treatment and a life with dignity. Parks’ story tells us, that one of the hallmarks of 
democracy is that people on the ‘outside’ can successfully claim a rightful place on the 
‘inside’. Coloured people, homosexuals, women and the uneducated were once ‘outside’ 
society. While their entry as active participants in society was expected to bring about 
chaos, they successfully brought prosperity and development. Today the ‘unwanted’ 
migrant is our Rosa Parks, and we should carefully consider the moral, socio-economic and 
legal consequences of keeping her ‘outside’ society.   
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